Why we’re studying the map again

Although the exact origins have been challenged, Mark Twain is most credited with the quip, “God created war so that Americans would learn Geography.” The line feels newly relevant as Venezuela becomes the next potential flashpoint, forcing us to reacquaint ourselves with a part of the map most Americans rarely study.

The scope of the military buildup in Puerto Rico, the nearest staging area under U.S. control, has become too hard to ignore, with an estimated 10,000 troops positioned across the island and nearby bases, supported by roughly ten F-35 fighters at Ceiba. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group now patrols that region of the Caribbean, backed by more than a dozen additional warships in surrounding waters. Overhead and offshore, MQ-9 Reapers, P-8 Poseidons, and expanded amphibious and air-mobility operations round out the largest concentration of American forces in the region in decades.

With so much hardware and personnel readied for action, we are only a misinterpreted sonar reading or a bilge-vapor explosion in a contested harbor away from tumbling into a war… but with whom? To answer that, I consulted the CIA World Factbook—one of the early treasures of the internet and one I still rely on today—which provided the usual basics. Venezuela, with just over 31 million people, remains under the control of Nicolás Maduro, though the United States does not recognize him as the legitimate president.

Venezuela’s economy has collapsed, with soaring inflation and average monthly wages that amount to less than the cost of a single supermarket cart of groceries in the United States. Despite abundant natural resources, Venezuela is a failed state by every meaningful measure: unelected leadership, widespread poverty and a governing structure held together largely by coercion.

Yet the country still fields 125,000 to 150,000 active-duty personnel and an estimated 200,000 militia aligned with the regime. Any engagement, as the administration seems to be threatening, would be more costly in time, life, and matériel than Britain’s campaign in the Falklands—and infinitely more complicated than the 1983 U.S. action in Grenada.

Geography alone shifts the calculus. Britain fought on remote, sparsely populated islands. Venezuela sits on a sprawling landmass of jungle, mountains, and dense cities—terrain that favors defenders and naturally lends itself to insurgency. Compounding this, Venezuela has prepared for guerrilla warfare, knitting regular forces, militias, and irregular networks into a strategy of prolonged resistance rather than conventional battle.

If this situation is not resolved peacefully, we may soon grow familiar with references to the “Bolivarian Army,” “Bolivarian Navy,” “FANB,” or “colectivos.”

The “Bolivarian” reference is not just to Simón Bolívar, often hailed as the “George Washington of South America.” In those instances, “Bolivarian” refers to ideological adhesion to the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela, resembling the party-infused structure of China’s People’s Liberation Army. The colectivos, meanwhile, operate outside any formal chain of command, carrying out extra-judicial killings, kidnappings, extortion and smuggling. Their presence would add a dangerous, irregular dimension to any conflict.

A war with Venezuela would be nothing to look forward to. Although the U.S. tries not to be in the business of regime change, it might be best for everyone if we provide resources for exactly that. Unfortunately, Venezuela is a dependent partner of authoritarian Russia and a heavily indebted economic partner of China, giving any conflict the classic earmarks of a proxy war.