Birther bill myths

Dear Editor,

I noticed a letter from someone in your opinion section expressing her shame at Mark Christensen's LB 654 "Birther Bill." I decided that I needed to write an opposing view to her comments because I think there are a lot of misconception about the citizenship issue and the presidency of the United States.

We all know that many so-called conspiracy issues have come out of the closet at President Obama's election concerning his legitimacy to hold the presidential office. Many, and I believe that writer, are under the impression it is all about being black or having a Muslim sounding name like Mr. Obama's. I say that those are the emotional sides to the issue. There is something more at stake here. It is the hostile takeover of the United States by persons not loyal to the flag nor subject to its jurisdiction or take over of the United States by native born children (born here) of enemies of our country. This is the heart of the argument.

President Obama's birth issues have brought this issue to light for whatever reason or motive. It is important regardless of the motivations to clarify this issue because we need to be able to trust the process and legitimacy of the office of the United States Presidency!

There is a difference between being a "NATURAL BORN CITIZEN" and a "NATIVE BORN CITIZEN." A natural born citizen is born to a father who is a US CITIZEN subject and loyal to our jurisdiction. A NATIVE BORN CITIZEN is a child born to foreign fathers subject to and under the jurisdiction of their originating country. It is a simple issue. To prevent the children of foreign enemies born on our soil from becoming our presidents and vice presidents, to prevent a hostile takeover of our culture and country by foreign bodies.

I have attached a legal argument with my letter written by Bruce Desautels of Stratton. Please include this reference by link for those interested in truth beyond the emotional and political hype of Mr. Obama's race, political affiliation and leanings. LB 654 is an important issue and should be addressed and confirmed with our support. Cabinet members are subject to extreme vetting by the FBI, but presidential candidates should be above scrutiny in regard to eligibility of office? I think not. We could wake up with a foreign dictator as president one day, very easily.

Jerie Quinty

McCook

EDITOR'S NOTE -- The attached legal argument referenced in the letter follows:

Senator Mark Christensen

Nebraska State House

Lincoln, Nebraska

Dear Senator Christensen:

I Bruce C.A. Desautels, a natural born citizen of these united States of America, and a citizen of the State of Nebraska, domiciled in the Village of Stratton, within the County of Hitchcock, submit to the public record my affirmation of Nebraska LB-654 the Birther Bill, a "Natural Born Citizenship" requirement for any candidate to have ballot eligibility for the office of the U.S. Presidency. Here follows my testimony...

A "Natural Born Citizen," as understood by those who wrote and promulgated the Federal Constitution for ratification by the several States, is a person whose parents are / were citizens of the united States of America at the time of their child's birth. The Framers' intent in requiring that only NATURAL BORN citizens be eligible to the Office of the Presidency was to prevent undue foreign influence through divided loyalties. Under the Common Law, in effect at the time of the U.S. Constitution's ratification, the legal principle understood by nation states was that citizenship is a quality transmitted from the father to his offspring at birth. The issue resolves to understanding the difference between the terms "NATIVE BORN" and "NATURAL BORN." This distinction first appears frivolous, but it is very important that we Nebraskans clearly understand the difference.

In Smith v. Alabama, Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the judgment of the court, said:

There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common law of England as adopted by the several States each for itself, applied as its local law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own statutes. . . . There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465

124 U.S. 478.

II. The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance, also called "ligealty," "obedience," "faith," or "power" of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King's allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual -- as expressed in the maxim protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem -- and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance, but were predicable of aliens in amity so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens were therefore natural-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the King's dominions, were not natural-born subjects because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the King.

However, by the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice C.J. Fuller, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), we read the following:

Obviously, where the Constitution deals with common law rights and uses common law phraseology, its language should be read in the light of the common law; but when the question arises as to what constitutes citizenship of the nation, involving as it does international relations, and political, as contradistinguished from civil, status, international principles must be considered, and, unless the municipal law of England appears to have been affirmatively accepted, it cannot be allowed to control in the matter of construction.

Nationality is essentially a political idea, and belongs to the sphere of public law. Hence, Mr. Justice Story, in Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 248, said that the incapacities of femes [p708] covert at common law

do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.

Twiss, in his work on the Law of actions, says that

natural allegiance, or the obligation of perpetual obedience to the government of a country wherein a man may happen to have been born, which he cannot forfeit, or cancel, or vary by any change of time or place or circumstance, is the creature of civil law, and finds no countenance in the law of nations, as it is in direct conflict with the incontestable rule of that law.

Vol. 1, p. 231.

Before the Revolution, the view of the publicists had been thus put by Vattel:

The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation, and it is presumed as matter of course that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children, and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. We shall soon see whether, on their coming to the years of discretion, they may renounce their right, and what they owe to the society in which they were born. I say that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. [Emphasis added]

Book I, c.19, § 212.

The true bond which connects the child with the body politic is not the matter of an inanimate piece of land, but the moral relations of his parentage. . . . The place of birth produces no change in the rule that children follow the condition of their fathers, for it is not naturally the place of birth that gives rights, but extraction.

And to the same effect are the modern writers, as for instance, [p709] Bar, who says:

To what nation a person belongs is by the laws of all nations closely dependent on descent; it is almost an universal rule that the citizenship of the parents determines it -- that of the father where children are lawful, and, where they are bastards, that of their mother, without regard to the place of their birth, and that must necessarily be recognized as the correct canon, since nationality is, in its essence, dependent on descent. [Emphasis added]

Int.Law. § 31.

The framers of the Constitution were familiar with the distinctions between the Roman law and the feudal law, between obligations based on territoriality and those based on the personal and invisible character of origin, and there is nothing to show that, in the matter of nationality, they intended to adhere to principles derived from regal government, which they had just assisted in overthrowing. {Emphasis added]

Manifestly, when the sovereignty of the Crown was thrown off and an independent government established, every rule of the common law and every statute of England obtaining in the Colonies in derogation of the principles on which the new government was founded was abrogated.

The States, for all national purposes embraced in the Constitution, became one, united under the same sovereign authority and governed by the same laws, but they retained their jurisdiction over all persons and things within their territorial limits except where surrendered to the General Government or restrained by the Constitution, and protection to life, liberty and property rested primarily with them. So far as the jus commune, or folk-right, relating to the rights of persons was concerned, the Colonies regarded it as their birthright, and adopted such parts of it as they found applicable to their condition. Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137.

They became sovereign and independent States, and when the Republic was created, each of the thirteen States had its own local usages, customs and common law, while, in respect of the National Government, there necessarily was no general, independent and separate common law of the United States, nor has there ever been. Wheaton v. Peter, 8 Pet. 591, 658. [p710] [Emphasis added]

As to the jura corona, including therein the obligation of allegiance, the extent to which these ever were applicable in this country depended on circumstances, and it would seem quite clear that the rulemaking locality of birth, the criterion of citizenship because creating a permanent tie of allegiance, no more survived the American Revolution than the same rule survived the French Revolution. [Emphasis added]

Doubtless, before the latter event, in the progress of monarchical power, the rule which involved the principle of liege homage may have become the rule of Europe; but that idea never had any basis in the United States. [Emphasis added]

The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution defines citizenship as: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." The important phrase is: "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

It is not sufficient that a child be born IN the United States, but that the child ALSO at the time of his birth is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. A citizen of a foreign nation is not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and by natural law, neither is his immediate offspring. A child born ON American soil to foreign-born parents, who are NOT Naturalized American citizens, is not a Natural born citizen, but rather is Native born alien--and thus does NOT meet the jurisdiction clause of the 14th Amendment; unless and until, on its own volition, at the legal age of emancipation, such child acts to "elect" U.S. Citizenship. In other words: the child must CHOOSE to whom he shall owe allegiance. This fact of choice underscores the difference between NATIVE born and NATURAL born. However, under no circumstance will a NATIVE born child ever be considered a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN, but only a NATURALIZED CITIZEN, and thus such a person is held perpetually ineligible to seek the Office of the U.S. Presidency.

Barry Soetoro (aka Barak Obama) was a British citizen at birth. Having been born with dual nationality, he was born with a recognized allegiance to a foreign nation. This disqualifies him from being President. "Native born" is not "Natural born" -- but then "accuracy and intelligent discussion is not the goal of propaganda."

In a 1904 article taken from the Albany Law Review entitled, "Natural-Born Citizen of the United States: Eligibility for the Office of President," Alexander Porter Morse stated:

"If it was intended that anybody who was a citizen by birth should be eligible, it would only have been necessary to say, "no person, except a native-born citizen"; but the framers thought it wise, in view of the probable influx of European immigration, to provide that the president should at least be the child of citizens owing allegiance to the United States at the time of his birth. It may be observed in passing that the current phrase "native-born citizen" is well understood; but it is pleonasm and should be discarded; and the correct designation, "native citizen" should be substituted in all constitutional and statutory enactments, in judicial decisions and in legal discussions where accuracy and precise language are essential to intelligent discussion."

http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.vie...

Here is Mr. Morse's letter to the Albany Law Journal of December 18th, 1884:

"It seems to the undersigned, aside from judicial sanction, that the children of aliens born in the United States are, to use the language of Judge Cooley in another connection, " subject to the jurisdiction of the United States only in a much qualified sense; " until they take some steps submitting themselves to the jurisdiction..."

This letter was written in 1884 -- before United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) was decided. The article quoted previous, was written in 1904 -- after Wong Kim Ark. The historical evidence proves that Morse held the same point of view before and after Wong Kim Ark. The article and the letter both indicate that Mr. Morse would not have agreed that Barry Soetoro (aka Barak Obama) was eligible for the Presidency.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0169_0649_ZS.html

The legal opinion of Attorney Breckenridge Long --a lifetime Democrat:

Long was a graduate of Washington University Law School. He served as Secretary of State and as our Ambassador to Italy, under President Franklin D Roosevelt. In an article, published in the "Chicago Legal News," Vol. 146, p. 220 in 1916, "Is Mr. Charles Evans Hughes a 'Natural Born Citizen' within the Meaning of the Constitution?" Long examined the issue. During his presidential campaign, Hughes's eligibility for the presidency was questioned because his father remained a British citizen. Mr. Long contested that a "native born citizen" of the U.S., who is also born to a British father, is not a "natural born citizen."

"Whether Mr. Hughes is, or is not, a "natural born" citizen within the meaning of the Constitution, so as to make him eligible, or ineligible, to assume the office of President, presents an interesting inquiry. He was born in this country and is beyond question "native born." But is there not a distinction "native born" and "natural born"? At the time he was born his father and mother were subjects of England. His father had not then been naturalized."

Long goes on to make the case that Hughes was not a natural born citizen:

"It is not disputed that Mr. Hughes is not a citizen of the United States, but if he had the right to elect, he must have had something to choose between. He was native born because he was born in this country, and he is now a native born citizen because he is now a citizen of this country; but, had he been a "natural born" citizen, he would not have had the right to choose between this country and England; he would have had nothing to choose between; he would have owed his sole allegiance to the government of the United States, and there would have been no possible question, whether he found himself in the United States or in any other country in the world, that he would be called upon to show allegiance to any Government but that of the United States."

Mr. Long failed to include former President Chester Arthur; and had he known that Arthur was also born to a British subject father, he too would have had to discuss that fact. However, the general public was unaware, until December 2008, that Chester Arthur's father was a British subject when Chester was born!

The New Englander & Yale Law Review, Volume 3 (1845) states:

"The expression 'citizen of the United States occurs in the clauses prescribing qualifications for Representatives, for Senators, and for President. In the latter, the term 'natural born citizen' is used and excludes all persons owing allegiance by birth to foreign states."

In conclusion, at the time of his birth, Barry Soetoro (aka Barak Obama) owed allegiance to Great Britain. That is not disputed; it is admitted by the President himself. This admission is the problem Barak Obama faces, should the issue ever reach the U.S. Supreme Court. A confusion of terms, combined with an ignorance of the Law of Nations--and, more pointedly, an ignorance of the intent of our Constitution's framers--has created, and shall continue to spawn, this national crisis of trust. For this reason, and to avoid a repetition of this episode, I strongly advise and condone that the codification of LB-654 be appended to the Nebraska statutes.

Sincerely,

Bruce C.A. Desautels

TEA Party Patriots of SW Nebraska

Stratton, Nebraska

February 7, 2011